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**Governance in the pacified favelas of Rio de
Janeiro:
an exemplary analysis of the development of
public, private and civil society services in Santa
Marta**

bachelor thesis to obtain the academic degree „Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)“
in the cooperation course “Public Management” of the Berlin School of
Economics and Law and the
Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin (University of Applied Sciences)

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Due date	03/31/2012

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List of abbreviations

AEIS	Área de Especial Interesse Social (Area of Special Social Interest)
ACI	The Approach of Actor-centered Institutionalism
BRIC-State	A term brought into circulation by Goldman Sachs for the four emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India and China.
CEF	Caixa Econômica Federal (Brazilian Central Bank)
EBAPE	Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas (Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration)
EMOP	Empresa de Obras Públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (State Construction Company of Rio de Janeiro)
FGV	Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)
Grupo ECO	Sociedade de Educação e Promoção Social Grupo ECO (Company for Education and Social Promotion)
IBASE	Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis)
IPP	Instituto Urbanístico Pereira Passos (Municipal Urban Affairs Institute)
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PAC	Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Program for Growth Acceleration)
PEEP	Programa de Estudos sobre a Esfera Pública (Study Program on the Public Sector)
POUSO	Programa de Orientação Urbanística e Social (Orientation Program on Urban and Social Affairs)
SMH	Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Secretariat of Housing)
UN-Habitat	United Nations Habitat
UPP	Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacification Police Unit)
UPP Social	Unidade de Política Públicas Social (Office of Public Social Policy)

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1 Introduction: Favelas as a challenge for the organization of mega events

In the next 4 years, Rio de Janeiro will be Brazil's showcase to the world: In June 2012 the UN-Conference „Rio +20“ on sustainable development will be held in Rio, 2014 it will be a venue for the soccer world cup and 2016 the Olympic Games will take place there. Brazil currently sees itself as a prospering BRIC country and intends to demonstrate it on the international stage on the basis of these mega events.

However, Rio has been fighting with serious problems of public security for decades. In so called „favelas“, squatter-settlements which distinguish themselves from the formal city by highly below-average per capita income, informality and a precarious urbanization level, armed organized drug gangs seized power. The favelas are spread all over the city. If the drug gangs fight among themselves, parts of the formal city get in the crossfire.

In order to host the mega events safely, the government of Rio de Janeiro is forced to improve the public security situation, at least in the touristic and venues´ regions. For this purpose, the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro since November 2008 has been occupying little by little the most important favelas with the military police. The goal is to bring the state monopoly on the use of force back to the government by deploying permanent police stations. The government calls this process “pacification”, the police units in the favelas are called UPP, an abbreviation of “Unidade Policial Pacificadora”.

In order to consolidate the pacification and the integration of the favelas into the city it is intended to promote the socio-economic development of the occupied squatter settlements (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 375). The improved security conditions allow external actors to enter areas they previously could only enter under threat or with the agreement of the drug gangs. This situation is new to all parties, as so far policy towards favelas has been of punctual character and for the first time the drug gangs exercise no long-term armed control over the favelas. The result is a far-reaching change in the constellation of actors and governance structures in the affected areas, which also includes Santa Marta. In this process of change numerous conflicts, problems and new challenges appear. At the same time, the state generally lacks the resources to improve the electricity network, the precarious infrastructure and the access to public services and goods across the favelas to the level of the adjacent neighborhoods. The formalization of Internet and TV connections is also a big challenge. Public, private and civil actors agreed to strengthen communication for a more effective and efficient pacification. In order to coordinate their interactions, the

municipal government runs the project “UPP Social”¹, which aims to coordinate the development of the services of all three sectors by dialogue, know-how and collecting data on the favelas.

The aim of this work is to give an insight into the impact of the pacification on governance in the affected areas by the example of Santa Marta. It identifies problems and challenges in the interaction relationships and reviews how the current constellation of actors can lead to an improvement of public, private and civil society services. The example of St. Marta provides an insight into the specific problems of governance in pacified favelas, but can not be generalized.

For the analysis of governance in Santa Marta initially the *concept of governance in areas of limited statehood* is used to identify Santa Marta prior to the installation of the UPP as such area. The actors and their interactions are analyzed on the basis of the *approach of actor-centered institutionalism* (hereafter ACI), to subsequently identify on the basis of the *equivalence functionalist approach*, which actors are led by what incentives to engage in the provision of services in Santa Marta. The term provision of services means governance services, which provide mandatory rules and/or public goods (Sonderforschungsbereich 700, 2009, 4).

2 The theoretical and methodological framework and its application-oriented conceptualization

For the present work I initially read and selected relevant primary literature. This was replenished with reports of participatory observations and interviews done as part of the project *Cidadania e Discriminação como Critérios de Análise da Política Pública (Citizenship and Discrimination as Criteria for the Analysis of Public Policy)*, which aims to analyze the implementation of public policy in exemplary pacified favelas from the perspective of promoting citizenship and reduction of stigmas that discriminate the inhabitants of those communities. The project is carried out since the year 2000 by the research program *Programa de Estudos sobre a Esfera Pública (PEEP - Study Program on the Public Sector)* of the *Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas (EBAPE - Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration)*, coordinated by Professor Sonia Fleury.

Some of the interviewees wished to remain anonymous and their statements not to be recorded. Therefore, the interviews were conducted by at least 2 people, so one person can document it writing, while the other carries out the conversation.

2.1 History und characterization of Santa Marta

Santa Marta is located on the slopes of Mt Dona Marta between the neighborhoods of Botafogo and Laranjeiras, in the centre of Rio's wealthy south zone. It is a relatively small favela with around 6,000 inhabitants on a territory of 55,000 square meters (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 377-380). Between 2003 and 2009, Santa Marta's spread to the west got stopped by the construction of a wall and to the east by the track of a cable car.



Picture 1: Panorama of Santa Marta

(Source: own creation)

Itamar Silva, activist and resident of Santa Marta, traces back first records about the settlement of the territory to the year 1939. At times, it was prohibited to build houses there, so people moving there built a provisional home over night. The new homes were registered at the residents' association of Santa Marta in order to regulate the ownership within the favela. Santa Marta was not connected to the mains till 1979. Then the electricity was delivered to a central committee of the residents which took care of the power distribution within the favela. The situation was similar with the water supply. Therefore, in Santa Marta, a culture and identity of self-organization developed, which is still alive (Silva 2003, pp. 304; Interview 3).

One institutional expression of self-organization is the residents' association of Santa Marta, where the inhabitants gathered in order to regulate the electricity and water distribution, health and legal issues in their community (Interview 4).

According to Vieira da Cunha the residents maintain four nurseries, a library and a radio station. Furthermore, there is a center for technological and professional training maintained by external foundations and a special correspondence course can be attended in the state-funded, free internet cafe located inside the building of the residents' association. The children attend a municipal primary school in the district of Botafogo, where the residents can also use the services of a small general medical hospital at no charge (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 377-380).

Thus in general Santa Marta began as an informal occupation of the territory in which the residents filled the gap created by the neglect of the favela by the government through self-organizing.

From the eighties on, armed drug gangs manifested their power in favelas because of the rising demand for cocaine. The high profits gained by the sale of cocaine aggravated internal conflicts and corruption within the police. The drug dealers were residents of the favela and sometimes highly regarded. The police officers who receive relatively low salaries often additionally earned on the sale of cocaine through secret deals with drug dealers. They received bribes to ensure that they largely keep out of Santa Marta. However, for various reasons, the police intervened repeatedly, often killing innocent bystanders. Because of the arbitrariness and the criminalization of residents by the police, many sided with the drug gangs, which strengthened their position by social assistance to the population (Interview 3).

In the end, the police was always in Santa Marta. However, the armed drug trafficking and corruption led to a situation, in which the state didn't establish a long-term monopoly on the use of force.

2.2 The concept of governance in areas of limited statehood

In this work the concept of governance in areas of limited statehood serves as theoretical background for the analysis of governance in Santa Marta. Thomas Risse criticizes that the discourse on governance has taken place in relation to developed democracies, which are characterized by a consolidated statehood. By statehood are meant "the constitutive properties of a state, namely international recognition, ultimate responsibility for the enforcement of rule and monopoly on the use of force"² (Sonderforschungsbereich 700, 2009, 7). However, the discourse ignored the fact that

there are areas of limited statehood. Those are "territorial spaces, policies and / or specific social groups, in which or for which the government's ability to set and enforce binding rules and / or the monopoly on force effectively are limited, at least temporarily"³ (Sonderforschungsbereich 700, 2009, 9). The reason for this is, "the weakness of political and administrative institutions to make and enforce political decisions"⁴ (Risse 2007, 10). Consolidated and limited statehood is not a dichotomous but relative variable. There are various levels of limited statehood, depending on how much the capacity of the state is limited to enforce political decisions (Risse 2007, pp. 4,10).

Governance areas have different dimensions, they "are characterized [...] by the fact that the existing need for order forms in them specific regulatory structures that are different from other regulatory structures and which have a relation to these areas"⁵ (Kötter 2007, 10). Therefore, an area of limited statehood can be of territorial, sectoral (on a given policy area) and social dimensions, such as on a given social group, e.g. nomads (Börzel & Risse 2010, 119). This work refers to the specific regulatory structures in Santa Marta as territorial governance area.

Santa Marta was at least until the installation of the UPP a space of limited statehood. With the installation of the UPP, the question arises whether the state's ability to enforce binding rules and maintain the monopoly on force is still limited and which consequences the pacification brings to the the local regulatory structures.

In order to answer these questions, the specific regulatory structures in Santa Marta are analyzed.

2.2.1 The governance-interpretation in areas of limited statehood

In the opinion of Thomas Risse it is a challenge in the study of governance in areas of limited statehood that the borders between public and private, between formal and informal are not exactly determinable. The governance functions are differently distributed among the different actors to the above mentioned subdivision. For example public actors should generally act in the public interest, which was not the case with the police in Santa Marta. In areas of limited statehood often own political and social regulatory structures are formed in which governance services are provided on an informal basis bypassing the state. This was the case with the assistance of the drug gangs for the residents of Santa Marta (Risse 2007, 13-14).

According to Thomas Risse, because of the reasons stated above it is necessary to understand governance as the "whole of all co-existing forms of collective regulation of social issues: from the institutionalized civil society self-regulation through various

forms of cooperation between public and private actors to hierarchical actions of state actors"⁶ (Mayntz 2004, 66). The detailed reasons for the use of this understanding of governance are not addressed within this work⁷.

2.2.2 The equivalence-functionalist approach

According Anke Draude, in areas of limited statehood the question arises, how different actors can be involved in governance when the state's *shadow of hierarchy* is weak. In established forms of governance involving non-state actors, such as negotiation and competition systems, a shadow of hierarchy motivates non-state actors to provide governance services. The term shadow of hierarchy describes not the statehood itself, but the fact that based on an existing ultimate responsibility of the state to enforce rules, non-state actors must expect a state intervention, if they do not abide by collectively binding decisions set by the state. Here Anke Draude proposes an equivalence functionalist approach to the observation of governance in areas of limited statehood, as the state's weakness makes it necessary to search for functional equivalents for its shadow of hierarchy. It is also necessary to look for functionally equivalent actors in the provision of governance services. At the latest here it is difficult to make a clear distinction between public and private or state and society. According to Draude, the equivalence functionalist approach allows escaping from the dichotomous distinction between state and society and the assigned tasks, and thus considers what actors really perform which governance functions in which way and which incentives stand behind it. In this way specific forms of social self-regulation that were created in the area can be observed (Draude 2007, 7-10).

2.2.3 Governance functions

For the application of the equivalence functionalist approach, various governance functions must be determined. In this paper I use the following functions deduced from the state functions by Anke Draude (following see: Draude 2007, 11-13):

Security

Regarding Santa Marta, in this area, only the *maintenance of internal order* is of importance. According to Benz "peace in a free society" is based "[...] on the mediation through legislation and enforcement of laws", which also means that "the peaceful coexistence of citizens" must be protected "[...] against illegitimate attacks by representatives of the state"⁸ (Benz 2001, 99).

Power (Herrschaft)

Part of this area is the governance function *reliability of expectations* (Erwartungssicherheit), which, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers in consolidated democracies is carried out by the judicative power. The legislative power is responsible for *setting collectively binding decisions* and the executive power for *enforcing collectively binding decisions*. Human and civil rights serve the *limitation of power* and the principle of democracy serves the *participation in power*. The distribution of these functions among actors in Santa Marta is of particular interest.

Welfare/Environment

In this area Draude outlines the following six functions: *economic stability, infrastructure, social security, public health, education* and the *protection of natural living conditions*. Infrastructure currently is very important in Santa Marta, not least because communication, transportation, water, gas and electricity are assigned to it. *Economic stability* is derived from the „economic function of the state“, which is responsible for „[...] creating a property regime“ (Benz 2001, 100)⁹.

By analyzing the actors and their interactions I want to determine who provides which of these governance functions. In this work only an insight regarding the current problems discussed in Santa Marta is possible, which means that not all of the above-listed governance functions are treated individually.

2.2.4 Functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy

Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse argue that in areas of limited statehood additional incentives next to the *shadow of hierarchy* may exist for non-state actors to participate in the provision of governance services. Self-interested and utility-maximizing actors are willing to provide governance services, if there are proper incentives and institutional frameworks. They present *four functional equivalents to the shadow of the state hierarchy*, which can be linked to each other (Börzel & Risse 2010, 120-121):

„The risk of anarchy“

Börzel and Risse argue that it is possible, that a lack of political order as well as the presence of a shadow of hierarchy encourages actors to participate in governance. If the pursuit of personal interests depends on the implementation of binding regulations or the provision of public goods, non-state actors are willing to take on governance functions; however, they require institutional framework. If the way in which governance

services are provided is regulated, „compliance with costly rules is all the more likely the better the norms and rules are defined (precision), the higher the degree of obligation, and the more adjudication of compliance is referred to independent monitoring” (Börzel & Risse 2010, 122). Therefore I analyze, how such an institutional framework has been constructed in Santa Marta *through limitation of power and participation in power* (Börzel & Risse 2010, 121-122).

„The shadow of external actors“

According to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, external actors such as international organizations can apply pressure on local actors to participate in governance. This is possible only to the extent, to which they have means of incentivizing or of exerting pressure to encourage certain actions. These means can for example be of economic character, such as economic interests in the exterior. This is the extended shadow of hierarchy of external actors (Börzel & Risse 2010, 122-123).

„Norms and socially embedded markets“

As Börzel and Risse say, actors with international connections that are active in areas of limited statehood (e.g. multinationals and foreign governments), have to meet increasing social criteria that are set by external actors. Especially if the actor who is acting locally wants to maintain a good reputation outside the area of limited statehood, he has to care about a good perception by NGOs and the civil society. A state in which the area limited statehood is located can for example be interested in a reputation as a safe tourist destination (Börzel & Risse 2010, 123-124).

„Traditional normative structures“

As Börzel and Risse write, actors must consider social norms of the local population in areas of limited statehood. Also local communities often maintain relations to transnational advocacy networks¹⁰, through which they can exert pressure on other actors (Börzel & Risse 2010, 125-126).

2.3 The approach of actor-centered institutionalism

The ACI is described by Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf as an "approach to examining the problems of control and self-organization at the level of whole sections of the society" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 39).

The institutional context

According to Mayntz and Scharpf, the approach is "based on the assumption that social phenomena must be explained as the product of interactions between intentionally acting - individual, collective and corporate – actors. However, these interactions are structured and their results influenced by the institutional context in which they take place"¹¹ (Scharpf 2000, 17). Also institutional arrangements constitute corporate actors (such as a partnership agreement), assign them tasks and put them together in a relationship. In the ACI, institutions can be understood as "formal legal rules [...], which are sanctioned by the legal system and the state apparatus" and "[...] social norms that are respected by the actors in general" (Scharpf 2000, 77; Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 48)¹².

Therefore, as formal state rules as well as informal rules are considered to be an institution, the ACI is appropriate for the application to Santa Marta. The following figure provides an overview of the analytical model of the ACI:




Figure 1: the ACI-model

(based on: Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 45)

Actors

According to Mayntz and Scharpf the institutional context determines the resources for action and influences the action orientation and situation of the actors. Within the institutional context, the actors themselves are another key factor. The ACI refers to corporate actors, but doesn't exclude individual actors, because they find each other in an "inclusive relation": "[...] all corporate actors have individual actors as members" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 50). Because otherwise it would be too complex, this avoids dealing with the individuals, as long as they can be set equal with the corporate actor.

This may for example be done with representatives of an organization. However, an examination of individual action orientation can not always be avoided, depending on how important it is for the corporate actor. If the Rio state governor is interested in a victory in elections that will take place soon, it can affect the action orientation of the state executive. "Quasi-groups" can also be aggregated from individual to corporate actors, if they respond "to an external stimulus in the same way" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 51). To understand the regulatory structures in Santa Marta, it helps to take certain individual actors in a quasi-group together (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 49-51).

According to Mayntz and Scharpf, actors have *action orientations*. These can be influenced by the position of actors within the constellation of actors and the institutional context, but also by the "perception of the situation [...], the available options and expectable results" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 53)¹³. The way the actor considers the situation and its possibilities characterizes his actions. Part of the action orientations are "selection criteria when choosing between options", these can be "[...] action-guiding interests, norms and identities"¹⁴ (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 54). Interests exist independently of the situation, but can combine with the action situation to a situational action. The same applies to normative expectations tied to the actors and their normative orientations. The interests and normative orientations shape the identity of the actor, eg. his interest in an election victory or in transparent action (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995, 52-58).

Mayntz and Scharpf add that actors always act in specific *action situations*, which can activate their action orientation by creating opportunities or constraints that provoke a certain action. The situation is characterized by non-institutional factors perceived by the actor. The pacification, for example, created a new situation for all actors in Santa Marta. But it should be noted, that the pacification is an unfinished state of upheaval, in which institutional structures lose their orientating effect and "situative factors and even individual characteristics"¹⁵ (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 66) become more important (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 58-60).

According to Mayntz and Scharpf, a "total result" of a social problem solution "can not be attributed to one actor only. [...] It results from the complex interdependence of interrelated actions" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 60)¹⁶. Consequently, actors and their interactions are considered in this study separately.

3 Analysis of actors and governance structures in Santa Marta

In this chapter the specific regulatory structures in Santa Marta as a territorial space are investigated using the ACI. First, the actors, their history, identity and orientation of action within the constellation of actors and their institutional context, then their interactions since the installation of the UPP are examined. Subsequently it will be identified on the basis of the analysis and equivalence functionalist approach, who provides what governance functions and what incentives - shadow of hierarchy or functional equivalents - are behind it.

3.1 Actors in Santa Marta

In the analysis of the actors, local and external actors are distinguished. Local actors are those corporate actors who have their headquarters in Santa Marta and whose individual members live there. External actors are those who are active in Santa Marta, but whose control instance is outside. The currently most discussed topics in Santa Marta are the treatment of residents by the UPP policemen and the impending urban regulation. In the favela, a variety of external actors is active. Not all can be considered within the limited scope of the present work. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to the actors that play a role in the above mentioned topics. Also the state actors were taken together to form a group of corporate actors, who are responsible for the planning and execution of the upcoming construction activities in Santa Marta. Below is a list of the actors:

	actor	actor type	comment
local	residents' association	organization	
	Grupo ECO	organization	
	drug traffickers	quasi-group	Individual actors, active in drug trafficking.
	residents of St. Marta	quasi-group	Individual local actors, not active within the residents' association or the Grupo ECO and similarly affected by the actions of other actors.
external	Light S.A.	organization	
	UPP	organization	
	state actors responsible for the urbanization of Santa Marta	aggregated corporate actors	All organizations belonging to the city and state government of Rio de Janeiro and actors acting on their behalf, except for the UPP and UPP Social.
	UPP Social	organization	Was taken out from the city government due to its special role in the investigation.

Table 1: actors in Santa Marta

(source: own creation)

3.1.1 Local actors

The residents' association

Founded in 1965, the "Associação dos Moradores" is the official organization representing the residents, currently chaired by President Jose "Zé" Mario. In its statute it is stipulated that it is responsible for public illumination, garbage, health and legal issues in the community. It was centrally responsible for the distribution and charge of electricity. When external actors organize events in Santa Marta they have to inform the association, which communicates it to the inhabitants via notice boards and speakers (Interview 4).

The Grupo ECO

The Grupo ECO is the most important actor besides the residents' association. It articulates and defends the interests of the residents. It was founded in 1976, publishes a local newspaper for information about political events and stimulates discussion about the role of the residents' association, which is why the group is opposed to the association (Interview 3). This group also includes Claudio "Rapper Fiell". As moderator he uses the radio station of Santa Marta as a platform for political information and mobilization of the inhabitants and is in a tense relation to the police (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 383). The Eco Group has many partnerships with external civil actors and regularly distributes news via internet sites such as Youtube.

The drug traffickers

It is unclear how powerful the drug dealers still are. At least they exert no more armed force and according to the police are financially so weak that it is difficult for them to persist (Interview 2).

The residents of Santa Marta

Prior to the installation of the UPP, participation of locals in government measures was difficult. The disarmament of the drug dealers basically allows a direct dialogue with the state, which is new to the residents. Therefore, the residents only slowly begin to perceive their opportunities to influence policy (Interview 4). Members of the Grupo ECO constantly point out the weak mobilization of the residents (Intern doc. 1).

The real benefit to the residents of Santa Marta in the occupation by the UPP is the consolidation of the monopoly on force in the hands of the police, so they now can move freely inside the favela. Many residents of the favela are still living with the experience of being criminalized by the police because of their origin (Interview 3).

3.1.2 Extern actors

Light S.A.

This private company is the concessionaire of the public electricity and public illumination network. The illegal connections of slums to the electricity network cost the company large sums annually, in Santa Marta 90% of the households had an illegal electricity connection (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 385).

The UPP

The UPP declares as its goal to recover impoverished areas occupied for decades by armed drug dealers and to bring them peace. It took a bearing on the community police concept and seeks proximity between police and residents, therefore new police officers with an additional training for work in the UPP are employed next to military policemen. The UPP is a project of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro and is subordinated to the State Secretariat of Public Security (Internet 2).

The police is known for its violent approach, the abuse of its authority and lack of respect for the residents of favelas (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 373).

The UPP in Santa Marta was established in December 2008. Currently there are 125 policemen based in five stations patrolling in the favela. The UPP is in authority to approve parties in public places in Santa Marta and to monitor the compliance of the rest period starting from 2 o'clock at night. The local commander decides on authorizations (Interview 2).

State actors responsible for the urbanization of Santa Marta

The governments of the state and the city of Rio de Janeiro are linked by the fact that they both are substantially involved in hosting the mega events. To the social consolidation of the pacification also belongs the urbanization of the favelas, in which both governments participate. Because of the mega-events both governments are increasingly exposed to the international public. Also political and economic interests are linked to it.

As Vieira da Cunha writes, the Municipal Secretary for Housing (SMH) established an office of the Program for Urban and Social Orientation (POUSO) in Santa Marta in 2009 to consolidate the urban planning through technical assistance and regulation of construction activities and to prevent the building of further illegal buildings. The goal is that the buildings in Santa Marta will one day meet the official building criteria, so that they can be considered as buildings with legitimate owners and be assigned an official address. Only then each mail can be brought directly into the houses instead of the

residents' association. For approximately 80% of the buildings of Santa Marta measures will be needed to ensure that they comply with the official criteria. Also the POUISO determines which buildings are located in an area at risk (e.g. landslide endangered areas during heavy rain) and must be demolished because of it. In the General Development Plan of the City in 1992, the demolition criteria for "Zones of Special Social Interest" (AEIS) were determined. In June 2010, the city government already recognized the passageways, staircases and squares of Santa Marta as public land (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 388-389).

The State Government is responsible for the upcoming construction and demolition. It commissioned the State Construction Company of Rio de Janeiro (EMOP) for the construction project and the private company "Urbaniza" for participation and relocation management. The participation management was a condition set by the Brazilian Central Bank for financing the project with federal funds from the Program for Growth Acceleration "PAC"¹⁷ (Intern doc. 3). In the first phase of construction, which started in 2003, the residents wanted to participate in its planning and implementation on the basis of a commission under the chairmanship of Itamar Silva of the Grupo ECO. However, for the EMOP it was more comfortable to deal with the drug gang, which is why it paid little attention to the participation efforts of the residents. Since the construction contract expired in October 2008, the construction stands still (Interview 3).

The UPP Social

Founded in 2010, the UPP Social is incorporated as a special project in the Pereira Passos Municipal Urban Affairs Institute (IPP). The City Government commissioned the local office of the UN-Habitat to take on the coordination and staff management of the project. In this way, the UPP can resort to international know-how and experience (Interview 7).

According to employees, before beginning the project it was noted that already 307 different social programs existed in the favelas, but that a coordination of these was missing. Therefore, the founding purpose was to coordinate existing actors and their services, identify local needs in favelas and to inform external actors so that they could offer targeted solutions for it. In order to make better use of local potentials, local actors are brought into contact for more cooperation. A team of two persons, which is also responsible for another favela, is responsible for Santa Marta,. The UPP Social has no authority and no strategic plan of procedure. „The airplane is built while it is in the air“ (Interview 7), employees say about it (Interview 5, Interview 6).

3.2 Interaction since the deploy of the pacification police units

The interactions in Santa Marta mainly concern the impending urbanization process and the treatment of local actors by the UPP policemen.

Interaction of the local civil actors

Before deploying the UPP a lot of residents were forced to leave Santa Marta due to the drug wars. Now they come back and reclaim their former houses. The origins of ownership are often unclear. There is only the register of the residents' association, which can not be used in court. The agreement can only be achieved outside of court (Interview 3).

Interaction of the UPP with local actors

When in March 2010 Rapper Fiell distributed a booklet with the aim to educate residents about their rights regarding police actions towards them, the UPP policemen felt provoked by him. According to his statements, Fiell and other residents were many times victims of arbitrary violence by the police (Internet 7, Internet 9).

Also, residents complain about the fact that the UPP police go on patrol with a machine gun and the children still grow up with heavy weapons in front of their eyes. The police admits that machine guns have become less necessary, but insists on keeping them for possible confrontations (Interview 2).

If disputes between residents arise, some directly contact the UPP, others first the residents' association (Interview 1, Interview 4).

Interaction of Light S.A. with local actors


Because of the occupation of Santa Marta by the police, in 2009 Light S.A. was able to remove illegal electricity connections, renovate the mains supply grid and install electricity consumption counters in the houses. In cooperation with the residents' association Light S.A. then replaced old domestic appliances with new ones and offered electricity consumption counters free of charge, so that the residents could control their energy consumption. Light S.A. also mapped the favela, labeled paths and numbered the houses. In this way, it could assign temporary addresses to residents and bring electricity bills directly to the homes. However, postal mails will continue to be sent to the residents' association (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 385-388).

Interaction of state actors with local actors

At an information event the State Government announced the establishment of three support committees for the upcoming demolitions and constructions, which will all have representatives of the EMOP, Urbaniza and the residents. The committee, among other things, will monitor and regulate the constructions and the resettlement. Residents affected by the resettlements will receive compensation in the amount of the value of the demolished house or an apartment in the new blocks (see picture 2).

At the information event local actors complained about the fact that they were not involved in the planning process of the construction work, that the POUISO office did not inform about the demolition criteria and prevented repairing precarious houses and that responsibilities of the City and the State Government were not clear. Also Zé Mário complained about the residents' association not being involved in the committees and neither the ECO group nor the residents' association having been previously notified of the information events.

The complaints were generally blocked off by state officials. They pointed out that the State is responsible only for those directly affected by the constructions and everything else is within responsibilities of others, of which they know little (Intern doc. 2).



Picture 2: Overview of the areas affected by demolition and construction works

Violet: resurfacing of access streets. Yellow, orange: housing blocks. Rose, blue: spare time buildings. Green: areas of risk which will be reforested (Internet 8).

Interaction of the UPP Social with local actors

The UPP Social began its work in Santa Marta only in October 2011. Until then the capacity of the local team had been exhausted by its work in another favela. At the introductory event Zé Mário and locals criticized, that nobody from the favela is in the UPP Social, that they do not have a local office and the team only obtains information punctually. Apart from this, there were not many interactions between the UPP Social and local actors (Interview 4, Interview 6).

Interaction of the UPP Social with other external actors

Employees of the UPP Social criticize that the state government's urbanization projects do not meet local needs. However, they can not exert any influence, because the project is carried out by the State and they belong to the City Government (Interview 6).

3.3 Discussion of the governance functions in Santa Marta

Security:

The residents' association as well as the UPP police officers are responsible for the mediation of disputes between residents. Prior to the establishment of the UPP disputes were settled by the neighbors, drug traffickers or the residents' association. The state legislation did not reach the interior of Santa Marta. Neighborhood mediation acted as law (Interview 4, Interview 1).

By establishing the state's monopoly on force, the UPP is clearly in charge of "mediation through legislation and enforcement of laws"¹⁸ (Benz 2001, 99), the role of the residents' association remains unclear. For greater safety of the residents from abuse of police power *limitation of power* is vitally important.

Power (Herrschaft):

Citizens must be protected "against illegitimate assaults by representatives of the state"¹⁹ (Benz 2001, 99), which human and civil rights are supposed to guarantee (Draude 2007, 12).

The Grupo ECO makes people aware of their rights and maintains links with external actors, which in turn can help in *limiting power*. Because of the formalization of the communication sector the radio station had to close temporarily, before it resumed in February 2012 with an official operating license. This example shows the adaptation of local regulatory structures to the official ones - from informal to formal. But until the reopening of the radio the resistance group had to get along without this means of articulation. There are no rules that enable the continuation of the local companies during the transition from informal to formal structures.

The example of abuse of power by police officers on Rapper Fiell, although he had recently distributed a newsletter about the rights of citizens against police officers, shows the importance of an awareness of the locals of their human and civil rights (Internet 9). This example also demonstrates another feature of the Grupo ECO: to convey to the residents of Santa Marta the consciousness that they must take advantage of opportunities to *limit power*.

The third function of the Grupo ECO is in the opposition to the residents' organization, which serves to balance the power relations within the favela.

The residents' association is in a role conflict because it carries out several power (Herrschaft) functions at once. On the one hand, because of its representational function it serves the *limitation of power* of external actors, on the other hand, as a reference for external actors it serves for the *enforcement of power*. External actors interact indirectly with the community through the association, e.g. by leaving postal mails for residents at the residents' association or announcing upcoming actions through it.

As the houses in the favela do not meet the official construction criteria and the residents' organization is in charge for "legal matters" and keeps the housing register, property rights in Santa Marta are still regulated by it, rather than by the state judiciary. Therefore with regard to questions of property there is a coexistence in the governance function *reliability of expectations*. By keeping the register of property, the association maintains a property regime, which is why there also is a coexistence in exerting *economic stability* until the houses in Santa Marta are assigned an official address.

This example shows the gradual replacement of the local regulatory structures by external actors. It most affects the residents' association, which now has to hand over governance functions to external actors or is less needed as a reference by them. So it was not informed by the State Government about the information event on the establishment of the monitoring committees. It is also not included in these committees (Intern doc. 3).

Because of the election of its president, the residents' association is an institution for *participation in power*. However, as the State implemented a new actor and a parallel way of interaction for power participation by establishing the committees, it jostled the association out of its role, although in this case that applies only to the urbanization project. It turns out that the residents' association is even less a tool of *power limitation and participation*, the more the residents participate directly through the committees.

However, this depends crucially on the fact that the population must take advantage of these opportunities.

Welfare/Environment:

By its statute the residents' association partly was responsible for *economic stability, infrastructure, public health and protection of the natural living conditions* (Interview 4). Because of the regulation of the electricity network the association now is not responsible anymore for the electricity distribution. It is interesting that Light S.A. is involved in infrastructure services that are not directly related to its function as power supplier, for example the mapping and labeling of the paths in Santa Marta. On the one hand, because of this the association got less important in communication issues. Light S.A. now delivers its mails directly into the homes. On the other hand, it participated in the naming of the paths and stairs (Vieira da Cunha *et al.* 2011, 391). This shows that the residents' association supports a consolidation of stronger statehood if it gets involved in this process.

In terms of *infrastructure* there currently is a side by side of the State and the City Government of Rio. The POUISO office of the City Government is responsible for planning and regulatory activities and the State for the constructions. But these constructions only involve parts of Santa Marta. In the rest of the favela, the infrastructure is still in precarious condition. Here repair work is done personally by the inhabitants, sometimes previously agreed with the residents' association, as state actors neglect these parts (e.g. residents complained about open sewers, see Intern doc. 1). While the residents' association is kept out of the state's urbanization project, it plays a complementary role in the infrastructure of Santa Marta to the state building activities, whether in labeling the paths or repairing the neglected infrastructure.

Many local actors and members of the UPP have complained about the lack of participation and information of the community about the urbanization process. It has been criticised that this does not correspond to what the residents want (Intern doc. 2, Intern doc. 3). By establishing the monitoring committees the state took a step towards more participation of local residents. However, it was a condition of the Brazilian Central Bank (CEF) for the provision of funds (Intern doc. 3). According to an employee of the UPP Social, government actors in Rio de Janeiro have no "communication culture" (Interview 7, Intern doc. 3). Participation and coordination, however, require communication processes. The lack of communication culture of state actors makes it difficult for local actors to participate in governance. A coordinated clarification of the complex responsibilities of the different state actors would help local actors to

understand with which actor to interact with regard to what concern. Knowing this would affect the action orientation of the local actors, as "the perception of the situation [...], the available options and expectable results" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, 53) is part of it. If local people know about their available options, they can act more targeted towards participation. In this way, existing opportunities for participation in governance in the matters of infrastructure and power could be used more effectively.

This does not change the fact that the urbanization project was planned without the involvement of the community. If in the future state actors in Rio de Janeiro want more participation of affected populations in urbanization constructions in the favelas, they will have to incorporate participatory elements already in the planning process.

3.4 The shadow of hierarchy and functional equivalents in Santa Marta

„The risk of anarchy“

According to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse non-state actors are willing to take on governance functions, if the pursuit of self-interest depends on the implementation of binding regulations or the provision of collective goods (Börzel & Risse 2010, 121). Based on this, it can be assumed that the residents of Santa Marta have established the residents' association in their own interests to collectively regulate electricity and water distribution and legal and health matters. If they had not teamed up to fix this by means of the residents' association, the risk would have been that nobody would carry out the governance functions the residents' association exerts. Börzel and Risse also note that non-state actors, when they take on governance functions because of the risk of anarchy, require institutional arrangements to carry these out (Börzel & Risse 2010, 122). The residents' association has defined its responsibilities and functioning in its statute. The Grupo ECO can be interpreted as a consequence of the creation of the residents' association, for it has found itself among other things as opposition to it.

Traditional normative structures:

In Santa Marta a specific regulatory structure developed, because otherwise due to the missing presence of state actors the possibility would have existed, that there are no regulatory structures. Because of the statutory responsibilities of the residents' association, it was able to *enforce political decisions* in Santa Marta. The ECO group serves for the *limitation of the association's power* within the community. Through the radio, local newspapers and discussions, the group also encourages *participation in power* by the locals, e.g. by spreading discussions on the forthcoming elections to the presidency of the residents' association through the radio.

The shadow of external actors / Norms and socially embedded markets:

Börzel and Thomas write that local communities often maintain links with transnational advocacy networks (Börzel & Risse 2010, 126). In Santa Marta, the Grupo ECO has relations to external advocacy networks, e.g. through its president Itamar Silva, who is also coordinator for the subject area "cities and territories" at the NGO called IBASE (Internet 3). Her many international partners include among others the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Ford Foundation and Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. Among its national partners are several universities and NGOs based in Rio de Janeiro (Internet 4).

This work can not prove empirically, how the partners of the group can apply pressure to other actors, such as the governments. As the governments of the State and the City of Rio de Janeiro pacified the favelas to host the mega events and as many interests are linked with these events, external actors such as the International Olympic Committee can put them under pressure. International media have already reported on controversial settlements and house demolitions in association with the olympic games; e.g. as consequence of a report by the New York Times on 4/3/2012, the Rio-based newspaper "O Globo" reported on the demolitions referring to the article in the New York Times (Internet 1, Internet 5).

Also the New York Times wrote about a case in which journalists have reported on demolition orders by the city government to private companies who have donated to the campaign of the current mayor. The mayor then denied a connection between the donations and orders, but the orders were cancelled shortly thereafter (Internet 6).

This case may show that negative reports in the media principally can exert pressure on state actors in Rio. Two days after the report of the New York Times members of the International Olympic Committee arrived in Rio to meet with the city government for the preparations of the games. However, it remains unclear what effects the media coverage had on this meeting.

The shadow of state hierarchy:

By installing the UPP the State consolidated its monopoly on force in Santa Marta. The incidents between UPP-policemen and Rapper Fiell show, that state actors active in the *security* area can still use force exceeding the limits of legitimacy.

In terms of *infrastructure* and *economic stability* state actors aim to enforce their rules regarding property rights and building regulations. Their rules are not yet completely valid, but in increasing ratio. Here you can discuss whether Santa Marta is still an area of limited statehood, as it is defined by a lack of the government's ability to enforce binding rules. Now in Santa Marta that ability exists, even if its rules are not yet valid and there are difficulties in the application of these, e.g. in adapting the buildings in

Santa Marta to the official building regulations. Here it is important to understand consolidated and limited statehood as a relative variable. In Santa Marta statehood can not be classified clearly as consolidated or limited, but should be seen as differentiated as above.

Anyhow, the *shadow of hierarchy* was established to the extent that the State could decide without participation of the inhabitants on the urban development projects in a hierarchical manner based on "instructions (commands), to which actors must submit, and their compliance could, if necessary, be enforced by means of coercion against their interests" (Sonderforschungsbereich 700, 2009, 11)²⁰. The inhabitants of Santa Marta had no say in the urbanization plans and are now forced to accept the house demolitions and relocations as dictated by the state. The subsequent introduction of the monitoring committees can only alleviate the effects of that decision.

4 Conclusion: more participation for a more effective development

Despite all criticism it can be summarized, that since the installation of the UPP, the provision of governance services is improving, especially public goods such as infrastructure. The electricity network got renovated, energy consumption can be billed directly and because of the improved security locals can move freely within Santa Marta. Also, the construction project of the state government will improve the infrastructure of parts of the community (the violet blocks in pict. 2 show the resurfacing of access roads; Intern doc. 1). It is also important, that existing services can better be taken advantage of since the pacification. E.g. Zé Mário called it a great progress that nurses can now make home visits (Interview 4). However, the manner in which the services are provided would be more effective with more participation of local actors, as described further down.

Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse argue that the *shadow of hierarchy* is an important incentive for non-state actors to orientate their actions closer to the public than to their own interest. The more state actors can enforce decisions hierarchically, the more non-state actors are willing to participate in governance, as they have to fear a hierarchical intervention of the state actor, if they do not participate. For state actors, however, the opposite applies: the more they can enforce decisions in a hierarchical manner, the lower the incentive to cooperate with non-state actors to provide binding rules and collective goods. Börzel and Risse explain this with the argument, that governments seek to strengthen their autonomy and ability to solve problems or at least to maintain it. However, as cooperation is associated with a loss of autonomy, state actors are only willing to cooperate with non-governmental actors, if it enhances their problem-solving capacity. Therefore, Börzel and Risse developed the following graph, which depicts

that it is likely that the *shadow of the state hierarchy* contributes most to problem-solving governance, if non-state actors and non-hierarchical modes of coordination are involved in the provision of governance services (Börzel & Risse 2010, 116-118).




Figure 2: the relation of shadow of hierarchy and cooperation incentive

(Börzel & Risse 2010, 117)

The *shadow of hierarchy* and a possible equilibrium with the willingness to cooperate can not be expressed quantitatively. The graph is interpreted in the way, that the incentive for governmental and non-state actors to cooperate gets more similar, when a shadow hierarchy is present and at the same time non-state actors and non-hierarchical coordination modes are included in a balancing degree in the regulatory structures.

The graph depicted above can be recognized within the context of the urbanization process in Santa Marta. Prior to the implementation of the UPP the shadow of hierarchy in Santa Marta was weaker, because government did not have the monopoly on the use of force. As EMOP in the first phase of the urbanization project built the boundary wall and the cable car, an accompanying committee set up by the local actors failed due to the lack of cooperation willingness of EMOP (Interview 3). The lack of participation opportunities for local residents during the current phase of construction has already been mentioned in 3.2.

In Santa Marta, a reconciliation of the cooperation incentives as described above should be aimed at. Although the state's urbanization project is already decided, much of the precarious infrastructure in Santa Marta remains unaffected by this work, which must be addressed in the future. Then government actors should rely on participation from the very beginning. Here, local actors and the UPP Social play an important role.

The Grupo ECO should not be excluded when external actors - whether state, private or civil society ones - provide new services in Santa Marta. The ECO-Group can encourage locals to participate in the provision of governance services by external actors. In its function of *limiting power*, they developed functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy through their connection to external advocacy networks, which can exert justification pressure on external actors acting in Santa Marta. *Local normative structures* have been connected to the *shadow of external actors*, whose interference the state has to fear, if it acts too hierarchically in Santa Marta. This shows that functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy can be used to limit the power of those actors, who cast this shadow.

The need to increase communication and participation culture in Santa Marta as well as among external actors is an essential prerequisite for this. Here it will turn out only over time, whether the UPP Social in its current model can reinforce the communication culture among state and local actors.

The residents' organization will remain an important means for participation by residents, although it is forced to gradually hand over governance functions to external actors due to the replacement of local regulatory structures. If external actors take on additional governance services in Santa Marta, they should involve the residents and their association as much as possible, as they know about the local needs and regulatory structures. In this way, the governance services could be adjusted to local needs and Santa Marta's problems could be solved more effectively.

Notes

¹ Unidade de Políticas Públicas Social, not to be confused with the UPP police.

² German quotation: „die konstitutiven Eigenschaften eines Staates, nämlich internationale Anerkennung, Letztverantwortung zur Regel(durch)setzung und Gewaltmonopol“.

³ German quotation: „territoriale Räume, Politikfelder und/oder bestimmte soziale Zielgruppen, in denen bzw. für die die staatliche Fähigkeit zur (Durch-)Setzung verbindlicher Regeln und/oder des Gewaltmonopols zumindest zeitweise faktisch eingeschränkt ist“.

⁴ German quotation: „die Schwäche politischer und administrativer Institutionen zur Herstellung und Durchsetzung politischer Entscheidungen“.

⁵ German quotation: „zeichnen sich [...] dadurch aus, dass der in ihnen bestehende Ordnungsbedarf spezifische Regelungsstrukturen ausbildet, die sich von anderen Regelungsstrukturen unterscheiden und die einen Bezug zu diesen Räumen aufweisen“.

⁶ German quotation: „Gesamt aller nebeneinander bestehenden Formen der kollektiven Regelung gesellschaftlicher Sachverhalte: von der institutionalisierten zivilgesellschaftlichen Selbstregulierung über verschiedene Formen des Zusammenwirkens staatlicher und privater Akteure bis hin zu hoheitlichem Handeln staatlicher Akteure“.

⁷ Regarding the reason for the recourse to this definition see: Risse 2007, pp. 15-16.

⁸ German quotation: Nach Benz beruht „Friedenssicherung in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft [...] auf der Streitschlichtung durch Gesetzgebung und Durchsetzung von Gesetzen“; dies bedeutet auch, dass „[...] friedliches Zusammenleben der Bürger [...] gegen illegitime Übergriffe von Vertretern des Staates“ geschützt werden muss“.

⁹ German Quotation: Ökonomische Stabilität ist der „ökonomischen Funktion des Staates“ entlehnt, zu der die „[...] Schaffung einer Eigentumsordnung“ gehört.

¹⁰ E.g. this can be networks of NGOs, churches, social movements and media: „A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services“ (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 2).

¹¹ German quotation: Laut Mayntz und Scharpf geht der Ansatz „von der Annahme aus, dass soziale Phänomene als das Produkt von Interaktionen zwischen intentional handelnden – individuellen, kollektiven und korporativen – Akteuren erklärt werden müssen. Diese Interaktionen werden jedoch durch den institutionellen Kontext, in dem sie stattfinden, strukturiert und ihre Ergebnisse dadurch beeinflusst“.

¹² German quotation: Im Ansatz werden unter Institutionen „formale rechtliche Regeln [...], die durch das Rechtssystem und den Staatsapparat sanktioniert sind“ und „[...] soziale Normen, die von den Akteuren im Allgemeinen beachtet werden“ verstanden.

¹³ German quotation: „Wahrnehmung der Handlungssituation [...], der verfügbaren Handlungsoptionen und erwartbaren Ergebnisse“.

¹⁴ German quotation: „Auswahlgesichtspunkte bei der Wahl zwischen Handlungsoptionen“; dies können „[...] handlungsleitende Interessen, Normen und Identitäten“ sein.

¹⁵ German quotation: „situative Faktoren und sogar individuelle Besonderheiten“.

¹⁶ German quotation: Nach Mayntz und Scharpf kann ein „Gesamtergebnis“ einer gesellschaftlichen Problemlösung „nicht einem einzelnen Akteur zugeschrieben werden. [...] Es entsteht aus der komplexen Interdependenz aufeinander bezogener Handlungen“.

¹⁷ An economic stimulus package of the Federal Government of Brazil, entities of all three government levels can apply for its funds.

¹⁸ German quotation: „Streitschlichtung durch Gesetzgebung und Durchsetzung von Gesetzen“.

¹⁹ German quotation: „gegen illegitime Übergriffe von Vertretern des Staates“.

²⁰ German quotation: „Weisungen (Befehle), denen sich Akteure unterwerfen müssen und deren Einhaltung notfalls mittels Zwangsgewalt und gegen die Interessen der Akteure durchgesetzt wird“.

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Intern documents of the Programa de Estudos sobre a Esfera Pública (PEEP)

Intern document 1:

Report on the launch event of the UPP Social on 10/27/11 in Santa Marta [status 11/20/12]

Intern document 2:

Report on the information event of the urbanization project on 01/17/12 in Santa Marta [status 03/16/12]

Intern document 3:

Report on the information event of the urbanization project on 02/06/12 in Santa Marta [status 03/14/12]

Interview list

Interview 1:

Name: Mr. Lourenço
Function: sergeant
Institution: UPP Santa Marta
Date: 11/23/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 2:

Name: Mr. Andrada
Function: officer
Institution: UPP Santa Marta
Date: 11/23/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 3:

Name: Itamar Silva
Function: president
Institution: Grupo ECO
Date: 09/29/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 4:

Name: José Mário
Function: president
Institution: residents' association of Santa Marta
Date: 10/27/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 5:

Name: Silvia Ramos
Function: professor
Institution: Cândido Mendes University
Date: 09/26/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 6:

Name: Ms. A., Mr. B.
Function: member of staff
Institution: UPP Social
Date: 11/28/11
Interview form: oral, personal

Interview 7:

Name: Ms. C.
Function: member of staff
Institution: UPP Social
Date: 03/02/2012
Interview form: oral, personal

Declaration on oath according § 17 (6) BPO/PuMa

I declare on oath by my handwritten signature that I have written this thesis independently and without unauthorized assistance. I also have not used any other tool and reference than those specified as well as identified citations.

This work has not been presented to any other examination office and has not yet been published.

Place and date

signature